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 Stephen Morse’s Anomalous Monism 
 
Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson 
 
 The relationship between the mind and the brain raises perennial philosophical questions 
and provides numerous avenues for scientific research.  The conceptual and the empirical issues 
that emerge from this relationship are exceedingly complex.  Add to this complexity the law—
with its own complex doctrinal requirements, conceptual issues, and normative and empirical 
standards—and you have a recipe for manifold confusions.  Stephen Morse’s illuminating 
scholarship on the many issues that emerge from the various interactions among law law, the 
mind, mental attributes, psychology, and the brain sciences has done much to elucidate the 
possible ways forward and to caution against dead ends.  In integrating law and science, and in 
dispelling confusions along the way, Morse manifests three distinct types of expertise: the 
scientist’s attention to empirical details, the philosopher’s concern for conceptual clarity, and the 
lawyer’s appreciation of the nuances and realities of the legal world.   
The heart of Morse’s discussions involves presenting and defending the law’s reliance on 
a “folk psychological” conception of human behavior.1  According to this conception, people 
(sometimes) act for reasons, and their actions may be explained, justified, or critiqued on the 
basis of their reasons for so acting.  These “folk psychological” explanations make use of 
                                                          
1
 We focus primarily on Morse’s article “Lost in Translation?: On Essay of Law and Neuroscience,” in Law and 
Neuroscience, 13 Current Legal Issues 529 (Michael Freeman, ed., 2010).  Morse also defends this conception in 
other recent works, including, e.g.,: “Mental Disorder and Criminal Law,” J. Crim. & Criminology (2011); 
“Avoiding Irrational Neurolaw Exuberance: A Plea for Modesty,” Mercer L. Rev. (2011); “Determinism and the 
Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility From Neuroscience,” Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. (2008).  
 2 
everyday, commonsense notions such as “desires, beliefs, intentions, willings and plans.”2    
Relying on the “folk psychology” conception, Morse largely defends the law’s conceptual 
foundations for ascribing legal responsibility, and in doing so he steers the law’s doctrinal 
regime past two potential pitfalls.  The first is the idea that the mental states that form the basis 
for the folk-psychological conception are either non-existent, or alternatively, exist but are 
epiphenomenal.
3
  Although he appears open to the possibility that such eliminative or 
reductionist projects could perhaps be carried out in the future, he rejects these ideas on the basis 
of current evidence and arguments, or any that are likely to be forthcoming any time soon.  He 
concludes that neither eliminative materialism nor charges of epiphenomenalism undermine 
ascriptions of legal responsibility.
4
  The second potential pitfall is the idea that law’s reliance on 
folk psychology commits the law to implausible metaphysical theses.  In other words, does law’s 
framework for ascribing responsibility depend necessarily on Cartesian dualism?  If so, too bad 
for the law, so the argument goes.  Morse rejects this implication (and thus this pitfall) by 
explaining that law’s folk-psychological conception is consistent with a rejection of substance 
dualism (Cartesianism) and is consistent with an acceptance of a thoroughgoing materialism. 
One can coherently endorse both the folk-psychological conception and the idea that any mental 
attributes the law considers to be relevant depend necessarily on the brain.
5
                
                                                          
2
 Morse, “Lost in Translation,” supra note 1, at 530. 
3
  See Churchland; Wenger; Greene & Cohen. 
4
  See Morse, “Lost in Translation,” supra note 1. 
5
  Id. at 536. 
 3 
If the heart of Morse’s neurolaw discussions concerns law’s reliance of the folk-
psychological conception, the heart of that discussion is the notion of “mental state causation.”6 
Morse’s defense of the law’s conceptual framework depends on the idea that the mental states 
posited by the folk-psychological conception (i.e., beliefs, desires, intentions, and plans) 
sometimes play a genuine causal (this is the first use of this term. Do we want a note here on 
what we mean by “causal”?  I remember Hacker has a nice discussion somewhere of 4 meanings 
of “causal”) role in producing human actions.  As he explains: “The definition of folk 
psychology insists only that human action is in part causally explained by mental states,” and 
“[v]irtually all actions for which agents deserve to be praised, blamed, rewarded, or punished are 
the product of mental causation.”7  Morse relies on the foundational idea of “mental causation” 
to steer the law’s framework for ascribing responsibility past the twin pitfalls noted above.  On 
the one hand, if mental states exist and play a genuine causal role, then eliminative or 
reductionist claims to the contrary are false.  On the other hand, if mental states can play this 
causal role in the absence of dualist commitments, then charges of implicit Cartesianism are 
likewise neutralized.  This is the course Morse takes: “I am simply accepting the folk-
psychological view that mental states—which are fully produced by and realizable in the brain—
play a genuinely causal role in explaining human behavior.”8 In sum, mental states are produced 
by and realized in the brain (they are not a distinct substance), but they nonetheless exist and 
play a (non-reductive) causal role, thereby avoiding the twin pitfalls that would undermine law’s 
framework for ascribing liability. 
                                                          
6
  Id. at 530. 
7
  Id. 
8
 Id. at 532. 
 4 
We agree that the twin pitfalls are to be avoided and that the law’s conceptual 
presuppositions largely avoid them.  Our critique is thus a friendly one—we endorse many of 
Morse’s broader brush strokes.  In this Essay we focus on some questions and challenges about 
the details.  We raise two issues.  First, we probe the idea of “mental causation”.  Although the 
idea plays a pivotal role in Morse’s discussions, he does not (so far as we are aware) spell out a 
detailed conception of mental causation.  Such a detailed account would posit an underlying 
theory of causation, explain how mental states cause physical movements, and clarify how (if 
mental states are fully produced by brain states) his conception avoids charges of 
epiphenomenalism.  The idea of mental causation—and the mind more generally—implicit in 
Morse’s discussions appears to us to most closely resemble the account presented by Donald 
Davidson.  Our first goal is thus to trace out Morse’s Davidsonian commitments.  Second, we 
question whether such a Davidsonian account of mental causation is necessary to avoid the twin 
pitfalls (described above) facing law’s folk-psychological framework for ascribing legal 
responsibility.  Although we find this account to be plausible, we present an alternative, rational-
teleological general (why do you use the word “general”? What does it add?)  account of what it 
means to explain actions in terms of mental states (or reasons).
9
 This account likewise avoids the 
twin pitfalls.  If the alternative is also plausible, then Morse’s commitments about mental 
causation may not be necessary to avoid the twin pitfalls (as he claims).  In short, there may be 
conceptual space between eliminative/ reductive views, on one hand, and dualism, on the other, 
for alternative accounts that undergird legal responsibility. 
                                                          
9
  See P.M.S. Hacker, Human Nature: The Categorical Framework 199-232 (2007); Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations; Severin Schroeder, “Wittgenstein”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action 
(Timothy O’Connor & Constantine Sandis, eds., 2010); Eric Marcus, Rational Causation (2012).   
 5 
Our discussion proceeds as follows.  Part I explicates Morse’s views on mind and mental 
causation in more detail.  Part II compares his views with those Donald Davidson.  Part III 
presents an alternative account of the role of mental states in explaining human actions that also 
avoids the twin pitfalls.  Part IV provides an example to compare the differing accounts.  Our 
aim is not to defend one of these two accounts, but rather to raise the possibility that whichever 
is correct, they each provide a foundation for ascriptions of legal responsibility. 
I.  Morse’s Mind 
 According to Morse, the law presupposes “the ‘folk psychological’ view of the person 
and behavior.”10  Under this view, “people are capable of acting for reasons and are capable of 
minimal rationality according to predominantly conventional, socially constructed standards.”11  
Because people act for reasons, specifying their reasons allows us to explain their actions. These 
explanations work by identifying a person’s mental states: “a bodily movement can be in 
principle understood according to the person’s mental states.”12 The folk-psychological 
conception presupposes “human action will at least be rationalizable by mental state explanations 
or that it will be responsive to reasons.”13  Mental states “such as desires, beliefs, intentions, 
willings and plans” thus explain behavior by providing the agent’s reasons for acting.  Morse 
gives the following example of such an explanation: 
the folk psychological explanation for why you are reading [his] paper is, roughly, that 
you desire to understand the relation of neuroscience to law to improve your work, you 
                                                          
10
  Morse, “Lost in Translation,” supra note 1, at 530. 
11
  Id. at 532. 
12
  Id. at 530. 
13
  Id. 
 6 
believe that reading the paper will help fulfill that desire, and thus you formed the 
intention to read it.
14
 
According to the folk psychological view, mental states explain action.  What is the nature of 
these explanations?  What makes them true?  Under Morse’s conception, the key to these 
explanations is causation.  The explanations are causal explanations.  Folk psychological 
explanations provide the mental states that caused an action; an explanation is true if it identifies 
the mental states that actually caused an action, and it is false if the mental states it specifies did 
not cause the action.  According the Morse, “folk psychology insists only that human action is in 
part causally explained by mental states.”15  These causal explanations provide the foundation for 
legal ascriptions of responsibility: “Virtually all actions for which agents deserve to be praised, 
blamed, rewarded, or punished are the product of mental causation.”16 
 Mental causation is not only important for the law’s folk psychological conception, it is 
necessary.  Morse asserts: “Human behavior cannot be adequately understood if mental state 
causation is completely excluded or eliminated.”17  Moreover, Morse argues, mental states must 
play a “genuinely causal role” in order to avoid the first pitfall: eliminative materialism or 
epiphenomenalism.  He explains that “[t]he law will be fundamentally challenged only if 
neuroscience or any other science can conclusively demonstrate that the law’s psychology is 
wrong and we are not the type of creatures for whom mental states are causally effective.”18 
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  Id. 
15
  Id. 
16
  Id. at 532. 
17
  Id. 
18
  Id. at 534. 
 7 
Fortunately for the law’s current framework for ascribing legal responsibility, “neither 
neuroscience nor any other science has demonstrated that mental states play no independent and 
partial causal role.”19 
 In recognizing mental causation, Morse notes that this does not entail dualism. “[I]t may 
seem, therefore, as if law’s emphasis on the importance of mental states as causing behavior is 
based on a pre-scientific, outmoded form of dualism, but this is not the case.”20  Rather, he 
maintains that mental states are “fully produced by and realizable in the brain.”21  Therefore, 
mental causation avoids the dubious metaphysical commitments associated with Cartesianism. 
 In sum, Morse recognizes a fundamental role for “mental states causation” and appears to 
endorse the following claims:  
(1) mental states exist and thus eliminative claims to the contrary are false (or at least are not 
supported by current evidence);  
(2) mental states make a causal difference and thus epiphenomenalism is false (or at least is 
unsupported by current evidence;  
(3) materialism is true (mental states are produced and realized in the brain) and substance 
dualism is false; 
                                                          
19
  Id. at 536. 
20
  Id. at 536. 
21
  Id. at 532. 
 8 
(4) mental states are produced and realized in the brain, but they are not fully reducible to brain 
states (or at least the possibility of such reductionism is not supported by current evidence).
22
  
Although “mental state causation” plays a fundamental role for Morse in explaining legal 
ascriptions of responsibility, his discussions raise a number of questions about the precise nature 
of such causation and exactly why it is necessary.   
 II. Davidson’s Mind   
 The philosophical views underlying Morse’s account appear to us to most closely 
resemble those of Donald Davidson.  With the philosophical literature, Davidson has articulated 
the most famous causal account linking reasons with actions.
23
  He then built on this causal 
account to develop a more full-fledged theory of mental events known as “anomalous 
monism.”24  Davidson’s ideas and the literature surrounding them provide resources for 
exploring Morse’s account in more detail.   
 Davidson endorses the following claims: 
(1) Mental events exist and causally interact with physical events and other mental events.  This 
is the same idea that Morse endorses as necessary for law’s folk-psychological conception. 
                                                          
22
  Consistent with these ideas, Morse outline the plausible “theory of mind” underlying folk psychological 
explanations as follows:  
The plausible theory of mind that might support such explanations is thoroughly material, but non-
reductive and non-dualist. It hypothesizes that all mental and behavioral activity is the causal product of 
lawful physical events in the brain, that mental states are real, that they are caused by lower level biological 
processes in the brain, that they are realized in the brain-- the mind-brain--but not at the level of neurons, 
and that mental states can be causally efficacious.  
Morse, “Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology,” supra note 1, at 33.  
23
 Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” in Essays on Actions and Events (2001). 
24
  Donald Davidson, “Mental Events,” in id. 
 9 
(2) Materialism is true.  There is only one substance, and dualism is false.  (Hence the “monism” 
in Davidson’s anomalous monism.)  This means that every token mental event is identical with a 
token physical event.  This is consistent with Morse’s claim that mental states are “fully 
produced by and realized in the brain.”   
(3) Physical events are governed by strict physical laws.  This is known as the principle of 
“nomic causation,” which holds that explanations linking causes and effects fall under exception-
less laws.
25
  Morse also, we assume, endorses the general idea that physical events are governed 
physical laws.  There are additional philosophical controversies about the nature of causation and 
these laws, but they are orthogonal to this discussion. 
(4) Mental events, while playing a genuine causal role (see (1)), are not governed by physical 
laws, even though mental events are token-identical with physical events that are governed by 
such laws.  For this reason, mental events are not reducible to physical events.  On this point, 
there is an affinity between Morse and Davidson, but they may also be an important difference.  
For Morse, the irreducibility of the mental to the physical may just be an empirical limitation—
we just haven’t figured out how to do it yet.26  For Davidson, however, this appears to be 
conceptual limitation.  In other words, it is not just that mental events haven’t been reduced; it is 
that the mental is, in principle, irreducible.  For Davidson, the conceptual irreducibility has to do 
with the holistic nature of rational explanations: 
It is a feature of physical reality that physical change can be explained by laws that 
connect it with other changes and conditions physically described.  It is a feature of the 
                                                          
25
  For a recent discussion of this aspect of Davidson’s theory, see Marcus, supra note 9. 
26
 See Morse, Lost in Translation, supra note 1, at 543 (“The coherence of responsibility and competence doctrines 
and practices are safe.  At least for now.”). 
 10 
mental that the attribution of mental phenomenon must be responsible to the background 
or reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the individual. . .  [with rational explanation] we 
must stand prepared, as evidence accumulates, to adjust our theory in the light of 
considerations of overall cogency: the constitutive ideal of rationality partly controls each 
phase in the evolution of what must be an evolving theory.
27
   
Despite this potential theoretical difference, the similarities are more important for our 
discussion.  Both recognize that the mental depends on (and indeed is ontologically identical 
with, the physical) but both also deny that the mental can be fully explained or explained away in 
terms of physical descriptions of brain events.
28
 
 We draw these similarities because, to the extent Morse’s conception depends on 
Davidsonian ideas, it inherits the theoretical advantages and disadvantages that inhere in the 
latter. 
 The primary theoretical advantage to the Davidson conception is that it purports to give 
sense to the link between reasons and action. In other words, it purports to explain what it means 
to act for a reason.  Causation provides the link.  When we say that an agent performed act X for 
reason Y we are saying that the agent performed X because of Y, and because of means caused 
                                                          
27
Davidson, “Mental Events,” at 222-23.  W.V.O. Quine, whose naturalism is often cited to support reductionist 
claims about the mind and mental attributes, also endorsed this irreducibility: 
I acquiesce in what Davidson calls anomalous monism, also known as token physicalism: there is no 
mental substance, but there are irreducibly mental ways of grouping physical states and events. . . . the 
mental predicates, for all their vagueness, have long interacted with one another, engendering age-old 
strategies for predicting and explaining human action.  They complement natural science in their 
incommensurable way, and are indispensable both to the social sciences and to our everyday dealings.  
W.V.O. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (2d ed. 1992).  
28
  See supra note 22. 
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by (reason Y caused X).  The “reasons” in this context are the folk-psychological mental states 
discussed above: i.e., combinations of beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.  Consider again Morse’s  
example of why readers read his article: their desire to gain knowledge, belief the article will 
provide it, and intention to therefore read it.  This combination provides the reader’s reason for 
acting, and, under the Davidsonian conception, it does so by causing the action.  The prior 
mental event brings about the subsequent physical event: a person’s reading the article.  A causal 
interpretation of the link between reasons and actions, Davidson argued, is correct because an 
agent could have several different (possibly inconsistent) reasons to act, each of which may 
rationalize, justify, or explain why the agent acted, but only one of those reasons may be the 
reason why she acted.
29
  (She performed act X for reason Y, not reasons A and B, even if A and 
B would rationalize or justify action X.) According to Davidson, the causal interpretation of “she 
did X because of Y” provides a way of picking out the true folk-psychological explanation for 
the agent’s reason or acting from any other plausible reasons.     
This conception also appears to avoid the twin pitfalls.  Because the mental event is identical 
with a physical event (in Morse’s words, the mental state is “fully produced by and realized in 
the brain”), the dualist charge is neutralized.  Because the mental event appears to be “genuine” 
causal work, and it not fully reducible to physical explanations of brain states, the radical 
eliminative/ reductionist charges are likewise neutralized (in principle for Davidson and perhaps 
only for the time being for Morse).              
                                                          
29
  Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” supra note 23, at 9 (“a person can have a reason for an action, and 
perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it.  Central to the relation between a reason and 
an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason.”) 
 12 
Adopting this causal conception, however, raises a number of theoretical puzzles and challenges.  
The most serious is that it does not appear to adequately distinguish acting for a reason and 
acting because of a reason (but not for a reason).  This is because reasons can cause actions 
without the agent acting for that reason.  For example, one’s desire to Z may cause one to 
tremble which may cause one to Z (this seems to need some explication. Perhaps substitute some 
action for “x”. It just doesn't read clearly as it is).  These types of causal chains fit the pattern of 
reasons causing (or bringing about) actions, but the folk-psychological explanations describing 
them are false (they do not accurately rationalize or explain the action in terms of the agent’s 
reason for acting because the agent did not act for that reason).  A second puzzle concerns 
lingering doubts about epiphenomenalism—if the mental event is identical with a physical event 
that is subject to the causal physical laws of the universe, how exactly is it that the mental event 
is contributing to that causal chain?
30
 A fuller account is required.  A third set of puzzles 
concerns how the causal story fits with first-person perspectives on action.  If the relevant 
reasons cause the action, why is it not the case that if someone knows their belief-desire-
intention, they can’t just sit back and wait for the action to occur?  Why are we not surprised by 
the bodily movements that ensue? Moreover, if reasons can cause bodily movements without 
being the reasons for the movements (e.g., desiring Z causes involuntary movements that bring 
about Z), then under the causal account we should be able in some cases to know the reasons that 
caused our movements but not know whether we moved voluntarily or not.  This is because, 
according the causal interpretation, even when the reasons that caused bodily movement is 
known, there is still an open question of whether the person acted for that reason. 
                                                          
30
  Kim 
 13 
Each of the issues raised in the previous paragraph has received great of discussion in the 
philosophical literature.
31
  Our aim is not to catalog all the back-and-forth; rather, we simply 
point out that a number of these issues are subject of ongoing philosophical controversy and thus 
to the extent Morse ties law’s account of legal responsibility to a Davidsonian-type account of 
mental causation,
32
 these issues and potential challenges are lurking in the background.                   
 III.   Rational-Teleological Explanations  
 After linking Morse to Davidson, our second aim in this paper is to step back from the 
Davidsonian picture and ask whether it is necessary to support the law’s folk-psychological 
framework for ascribing legal responsibility.  We discuss a second option for the role of mental 
states in ascriptions of legal responsibility.  Under this second option, explanations of actions in 
terms of reasons are rational explanations with a teleological structure—rather than the Davidson 
structure, which more closely resembles a type of efficient causation in which one event brings 
about the next (think of bowling balls hitting pins or dominos falling over).  We are indifferent to 
whether the alternative is called “non-causal”33 or a simply a different type of causal 
explanation
34
; what matters is that it differs from the Davidsonian picture and may undergird 
legal responsibility. 
 Let’s start with the similarities.  As with the Morse-Davidson picture, the rational-
teleological framework also attempts to rationalize and understand actions by explaining the 
agent’s action in terms of her reason for acting.  It is first important to note that not all 
                                                          
31
 Cites   
32
 For an overview of the philosophical issues and how they relate to law, see Michael Moore, Act and Crime.   
33
  See Hacker, supra note 9. 
34
  See Marcus, supra note 9. 
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explanations of behavior are causal explanations.  If we want to explain to someone why a 
baseball player engaged in certain movements (e.g., attempted to bunt), the explanation will 
make reference to the rules of baseball and strategies for scoring runs; it will not be a causal 
explanation of how events in the player’s brain caused his physical bodily movements (although 
such an explanation may be called, and may be given, in a different setting).  More generally, 
many explanations of actions in terms of reasons are normative explanations, citing a rule, 
standard, or norm as the reason for an action.  The reasons that rationalize or explain the action 
may also refer to what caused the person to act, but not necessarily (as the previous section 
discussed).   
 Turning now to a key difference, in giving a rational explanation of an action in terms of 
reasons we may explain the action by giving the purpose for which it was carried out.  Suppose 
we want to know why a baseball player moved the bat the way he did. We might explain that he 
did so (i.e., he bunted) in order to move to runner on first base to second base.  We have given a 
reason that explains his action.  This explanation may be true or false.  He may have done so for 
this reason, making the explanation true. Or he may have done so for a different reason (making 
the explanation for a reason???????.) We can further breakdown our explanation into the 
practical-reasoning pattern described earlier—he desired to move the runner on first base to 
second base, he believed bunting would be a way to do so, and thus he formed an intention to do 
so.  In exercising this practical, rational ability, the baseball player’s action has a teleological 
structure.  We might describe this as a kind of causation—in which one state of affairs (moving 
the runner) caused another state of affairs (the player to bunt)—but it is not the kind of causation 
at work in the Davidsonian picture.  It is not as if the future state of affairs (moving the runner to 
second base) is pulling the prior event (bunting) forward like a train engine pulling a car.  It is 
 15 
more like the event-as-a-whole provides an explanation of its parts.  We can say the same thing 
about the previous example of someone reading Morse’s article to learn about neurolaw.  We can 
explain why someone read the article by explaining that she did so in order to learn about 
neurolaw.  This explanation likewise may be true or false.  Learning about neurolaw may be a 
teleological “cause” of why someone read the article, but it would be causal in the sense of the 
event-as-whole explaining why its parts unfolded as they did, not in the sense of one event 
bringing about another event (i.e., one domino hitting another or pulling another along). 
 When we have true explanations in this sense, we can rationalize and better understand 
the person and her actions.  We are thus in a better position to evaluate the person’s conduct: 
whether she was acting voluntarily or not; whether the person was justified or not; and so on.  As 
Peter Hacker explains, explanations of actions in terms of reasons are hermeneutic—they allow 
us to interpret the person’s behavior and better understand it “ideographically rather than 
nomothetically.”35  In rejecting a causal account, Hacker, in words that could have been written 
by Stephen Morse, continues: 
Knowing his reasons for doing what he did, we may come to know what kinds of things 
weigh with him in his deliberations, and what kinds of considerations move him to act.  
We can see the extent of his rationality and the degree of his reasonableness, as well as 
the values for the sake of which he is prone to take action.  Such explanations enable us 
not only to judge the agent and evaluate what he did, but also to judge his character.  It 
enables us to understand our fellow human beings as persons.
36
 
                                                          
35
 Hacker, supra note 32, at 232. 
36
 Id. 
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Explanations of actions along these lines strike us as good a foundation as any for ascriptions of 
legal responsibility.  What is added by postulating an additional (efficient foot note needed to 
explain “efficient” cause) causal role for mental states, thereby opening up the various challenges 
and puzzles discussed in the previous section? 
 Before turning to this question, we first point out two advantages to this account. First, it 
too avoids the twin pitfalls.  It is consistent with a materialist conception of mind and does not 
imply substance dualism.  Second, it accounts for the distinction between acting because of a 
reason and acting for a reason that creates problems for the Davidsonian account.  The 
problematic situation—in which an agent engages in bodily movements because of certain 
reasons (beliefs and desires) but has not acted for those reasons—does not display the rational-
teleological structure.
37
  The person has not acted in order to bring about that end. 
 The primary motivation for the Davidsonian picture is the need to account for the fact 
that multiple reasons may rationalize an action but not be the reason for the action.
38
  But note 
that there is no reason to think that just because a reason rationalizes an action this makes an 
explanation in terms of that reason true.
39
  In other words, there may still be a fact of the matter 
as to why, or for what purpose, a person acted.  The practical rationality that underlies law’s 
ascriptions of responsibility (under the both the Davidsonian and teleological accounts) is a type 
of ability.  To engage in action is to exercise this ability.  The teleological pattern that purports to 
explain the action may refer to pattern of inferences the agent actually expressed or would 
                                                          
37
  For example, if Jones desires to X, and recognizing this desire causes Jones to tremble thereby causing X, Jones 
did not voluntarily tremble in order to X.   
38
 See supra note 29 
39
  Marcus, supra note 9, at 152 (“I am not aware that anyone ever held the view that to say what reason someone 
had to perform an action is by itself to explain her performance of it.) 
 17 
otherwise endorse after the fact.  This makes some patterns true explanations and some false.  
This facticity is consistent with uncertainty (epistemic or metaphysical) in individual cases as to 
the actual reasons for an action, and it is consistent with the fact that the explanation a person 
gives or otherwise endorses for his action may be defeasible.
40
 
 To illustrate how these two accounts each conceptualize the role of mental states in 
ascriptions of responsibility, we contrast them with a detailed example.          
IV. An Example 
 In a well-known article purporting to challenge the law’s “folk psychological” framework 
for ascribing responsibility, Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen present an example that, they 
claim, reveals why ascriptions of responsibility will come to be seen as unjustified.
41
  The 
example is the hypothetical case of “Mr. Puppet.” In prior work, both we and Morse have 
pointed out the several problems with the arguments of Greene and Cohen and with the 
inferences they draw for the example of Mr. Puppet.
42
  Our aim is not to rehash those arguments; 
rather, we present the example in order to contrast the two different ways that one might 
conceptualize mental-state explanations in a way that resists the conclusions of Greene and 
Cohen.        
Here is the example.  Imagine a group of scientists who create an individual (“Mr. 
Puppet”) who engages in criminal activity.  At Mr. Puppet’s trial, the lead scientist explains his 
relationship to Mr. Puppet as follows: 
                                                          
40
 Hacker, supra note 9, at 225. 
41
  Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, “For Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” in Law & the 
Brain (Zeki & Goodenough eds., 2006). 
42
 Cites 
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I designed him.  I carefully selected every gene in his body and carefully scripted every 
significant event in his life so that he would become precisely what he is today.  I 
selected his mother knowing that she would let him cry for hours and hours before 
picking him up.  I carefully selected each of his relatives, teachers, friends, enemies, etc. 
and told them exactly what to say to him and how to treat him.
43
  
 According to Greene and Cohen, Mr. Puppet is guilty under the law’s “folk 
psychological” framework if he was rational at the time of his actions.  They assume that he was 
“as rational as other criminals and, yes, it was his desires and beliefs that produced his actions.”  
Even though his Mr. Puppet’s mental states produced his actions, they conclude that “intuitively, 
this is not fair.”44  They contend it is not fair because “his beliefs and desires were rigged by 
external forces, and that is why, intuitively he deserves our pity more than our moral 
condemnation.”45  Moreover, all criminal defendants (and indeed all humans) are like Mr. Puppet 
in the relevant respects.  Although not designed by scientists, our beliefs, desires, and “rational” 
actions are all “rigged by external forces” beyond our control.  If Mr. Puppet is not responsible, 
then no one else is either. 
 Greene and Cohen think that this example poses a challenge to the “folk psychological” 
framework because that framework depends on a notion of “magical mental causation.”46  The 
“folk psychological system deals with unseen features of minds: beliefs, desires, intentions, 
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etc.,”47 and a “crucial, if not the defining feature” of mental states is that they are the product of 
“an uncaused causer.”48  Moreover, “[s]eeing something as an uncaused causer is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition” for ascriptions of moral and legal responsibility.49  Neuroscience, they 
predict, will help us to appreciate that this type of “uncaused” mental causation is an illusion and 
to appreciate the “mechanical processes that cause behavior”50—the mechanical processes that 
make us all like Mr. Puppet. 
 There are a number of ways to resist their conclusions.  One way is to concede their 
points about “magical mental causation” and “uncaused causation” and endorse these notions.  
Someone adopting substance dualism might, for example, posit that the mind is a distinct 
substance, outside the causal matrix of the physical world, but that nevertheless exerts a causal 
influence on behavior—it is the uncaused causer.  We, like Morse, reject this option. 
 The other avenues reject the assumption that legal responsibility requires “uncaused 
causation.”  This dubious assumption is based on the controversial presuppositions that (1) free 
will is incompatible with physical determinism, and (2) legal and moral responsibility require the 
existence of this type of free will.  Both of these presuppositions are problematic, and Greene 
and Cohen offer no new arguments to defend either.  In recognizing that ascriptions of 
responsibility are compatible with physical determinism, however, this still leaves open the 
question of how best to characterize explanations of actions in terms of mental states. 
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Let’s return to Mr. Puppet.  Suppose again that he has the requisite rationality to be held 
legally responsible for his conduct—he is able to engage in practical reasoning in light of his 
beliefs and desires, he is responsive to reasons, and so on.  Now, suppose that Mr. Puppet robs 
someone at gunpoint on the street.  Why did he do so?  He wanted money.  Prior to engaging in 
the crime, Mr. Puppet went through the following bit of practical reasoning:  he desires money, 
he believes that the person walking toward him has money, and so he forms the intention to point 
a gun at the person and say, “give me your wallet.”  He was not sleepwalking, he was not 
suffering from psychosis, he was not under duress, and no other legally recognized excusing 
conditions obtained.  We think that even in a causally determined physical universe, Mr. Puppet 
ought to be held legally responsible or his conduct, and we think Morse would agree.
51
   
The key issue we are pressing is: why?  Is it because, as the Davidsonian would have it, 
Mr. Puppet’s mental states formed a link in a causal chain that caused Mr. Puppet’s actions in the 
causally-determined physical world, although the mental states are not reducible to features in 
the physical world?  Or is it simply that we understand, given what we know, that he was acting 
voluntarily and why he did it (in order to get money)?  We assume that, under either conception, 
Mr. Puppet’s brain states would be the same, and that in the counterfactual world in which his 
mental states were different his brain states would be different as well.  What is gained and what 
is lost in adopting the Davidsonian or the rational-teleological explanatory framework, if each is 
capable of giving a true explanation of Mr. Puppet’s reason for acting and each provides a basis 
for responsibility?  We pose these questions as a challenge for Morse to the extent that he 
endorses the Davidsonian picture as the only way to save the law’s folk-psychological 
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framework.  One downside to this route is that it reintroduces a mysterious notion of mental 
cause that is akin to efficient, mechanical causation but that is somehow distinct and anomalous, 
along with the other issues we discussed in Part II.   
V.  Conclusion 
Mental causation may be one way to account for the link between reasons and action, and 
it may be the most philosophically popular way to do so, but there may be other ways to account 
for true explanations of actions in terms of reasons.  If so, then the Davidsonian account may not 
be necessary to avoid the twin pitfalls of eliminative materialism/ reductionism, on one hand, and 
substance dualism, on the other.  We agree the twin pitfalls are to be avoided and the law, to its 
credit, largely avoids them.  We can recognize these conclusions while remaining agnostic 
regarding the internecine debates between those inspired by Davidson and those inspired by 
Wittgenstein on what it means to act for a reason.  At least we think so.
52
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